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Abstract: 
Numerous papers in the “law and finance” literature have established that countries with better 
functioning legal institutions enjoy better developed capital markets, and that legal origin is a 
fundamental determinant of legal institutions (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 2006; Djankov et al. 
2007). In this study, we test whether banks are willing to grant more credit to the private sector 
when they enjoy superior legal protection. We test this hypothesis using bank-level data over the 
period 2000-2006 from 102 emerging-market countries and a random-effects model that controls 
for bank heterogeneity. We find that lenders allocate a significantly higher portion of their assets 
to loans (i) where they enjoy Socialist legal origin rather than English or French legal origin; (ii) 
where enforcement of debt contracts is more efficient and (iii) where banks enjoy fewer 
restrictions on their operations. These findings support our hypothesis that superior legal 
protection leads to more bank credit, which, in turn, should lead to higher economic growth. 
However, these findings contradict the predictions based upon the theory of legal origin. 
 
Keywords: banking, creditor rights, emerging markets, investor protection, legal origin 
JEL Classifications: G21, G34 
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1. Introduction 
 Recent research has established that legal origin and investor protection are important 
determinants of financial development.1 Countries with British common-law legal origin and 
better investor protection have better developed financial markets, which, in turn, lead to higher 
levels of economic growth (King and Levine, 1993). Much of this research has analyzed country-
level data, usually focusing on how investor protection affects the amount of private sector 
credit, which King and Levine (1993) and many others have linked to future economic growth. 
One question left largely unanswered by this literature is how lenders at the micro-level respond 
to differences in governance regimes. This question is especially important to emerging market 
economies, where bank debt is the primary source of business credit.   
 In this article, we extend the law and finance literature by using firm-level data from more 
than two thousand banks in 102 emerging-market countries to analyze how lenders respond to 
differences in legal origin and investor protection. Using a random-effects model that controls 
for bank heterogeneity, we find that lenders allocate a significantly higher portion of their assets 
to loans (i) where they enjoy Socialist legal origin rather than English or French legal origin; (ii) 
where enforcement of debt contracts is more efficient and (iii) where banks enjoy fewer 
restrictions on their operations. Where banks operate in countries with strong business and legal 
environments, they have incentive to extend more loans to the private sector. These findings 
generally support our hypothesis that superior legal protection leads to more bank credit, which, 
in turn, should lead to higher economic growth.  However, they contradict the predictions based 
upon the theory of legal origin. 
                                                          
1 See La Porta et al. 1997, 1998 and 2002; Levine 1999, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998; 
Djankov et al. 2003 and 2007; and Qian and Strahan 2006. 
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 Our research builds on two strands of the literature: the “law and finance” literature and the 
“finance and growth” literature. The “law and finance” literature, which grew out of the seminal 
works of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), has established that differences in legal protection of 
investors explain much of the variation in financial-sector development and that legal origin 
explains much of the variation in legal protection of investors. The “finance and growth” 
literature, which is most closely associated with King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos 
(1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1995, 1998), has established that financial sector development is 
positively related to economic growth. 
 We extend the literature by documenting one channel by which legal protection leads to 
better financial-sector development. With better investor protection, bankers increase the portion 
of their asset portfolios allocated to loans. In aggregate, this should lead to higher levels of 
private-sector credit, which the “finance and growth” literature has shown to be positively related 
to economic growth. Contrary to most previous research that has examined country-level data, 
we adopt a micro approach to examining the impact of the business and legal environments on 
banking operations, using bank-level rather than country-level data. 
 Consistent with the theoretical works of Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart and Moore 
(1992, 1994), we hypothesize that the risk-taking behavior of banks is affected by country’s legal 
tradition and the prevailing structures in terms of more openness in banking practices and better 
protection of property rights. Specifically, in countries with better legal protection, banks have an 
incentive to take on more portfolio risk because they face less risk of expropriation by borrowers.  
In other words, they can make more risky loans because their expected loss per loan is smaller 
when they enjoy the superior creditor protection available from the institutions in countries of 
British legal origin. 
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 Our analysis rests on a panel data set of 2,723 commercial banks from 102 emerging 
economies over the period 2000-2006. Our interest has two justifications: first, there is wide 
variation in legal protection across these countries; and second, banking in these parts of the 
world has received scant attention in the academic literature.  
 La Porta et al. (1998) argue that different legal origins, especially French civil law versus 
English common law, provide much different levels of investor protection that are reflected in 
financial sector development. Most of the countries included in the study were colonized by the 
world economic powers at the time until the middle of the past century and there is wide 
variation in creditor protection among them. This makes emerging economies an especially 
fertile laboratory for testing our hypothesis.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 presents the data and variables used in the study followed by 
multivariate analyses of the risk-return characteristics of commercial banks in section 4. Section 
5 provides a summary and conclusions. 
 
2. A brief review of the relevant literature 
 The “law and finance” literature essentially begins with La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), who 
argue and provide empirical evidence at the country level that the most important determinant of 
capital markets development is the degree of legal protection provided to investors. Corporate 
finance flourishes in countries with legal systems that better protect investors’ rights and support 
contract enforcement. In addition, they find that a country’s “legal origin” is a fundamental 
determinant of investor protection. “Legal origin” refers to the legal family from which a 
country’s legal system evolved.  
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 In their 1998 article, La Porta et al. distinguish among two broad legal traditions: English 
common law and Roman civil law. Within the broad civil law tradition, they distinguish three 
families—French, German and Scandinavian. La Porta et al. find that countries with English 
common law tradition enjoy the best investor protection while countries with French civil law 
tradition suffer the worst investor protection.  They attribute these finding to differences in the 
legal protection from institutions left behind by the colonial powers. Also in this article, La Porta 
et al. develop an index of creditor rights, which they show is higher in common law countries 
than in civil law countries. 
 In a 1999 follow-up article, La Porta et al. expand the four families to five—with the 
addition of the Socialist civil law tradition, which enables them to better categorize eastern 
European countries that emerged following the breakup of the Soviet Union. They find that 
countries with Socialist civil law tradition suffer from poor legal protection similar to countries 
with French civil law tradition.  
 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) analyze a sample of 70 countries for evidence 
regarding how well legal origins can explain financial development.  Among other findings, but 
most relevant to this study, they find that credit from financial intermediaries to the private sector 
as a share of GDP is higher in countries of British legal origin. 
 Djankov et al. (2003) construct two indices of procedural formalism in legal resolution of 
disputes—how many days it takes to collect a bounced check and how many days it takes to 
evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent. They find considerable variation in these measures and 
that procedural formalism is greater in civil-law countries than common law countries and in 
poorer countries than in rich countries. 
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 Djankov et al. (2007) extend previous work on legal protection of creditors to a panel 
analysis of 129 countries over 25 years. They find that the creditors’ rights index developed by 
La Porta et al. (1998) is associated with higher levels of private sector credit, but that this 
relationship does not hold in poorer countries. They also find that procedural formalism is 
associated with lower levels of private sector credit but, again, this relationship does not hold in 
poorer countries.  
 Qian and Strahan (2007) examine data on individual bank loans for evidence on how 
differences in legal systems affect terms of bank loans. Like Djankov et al. (2007), they focus on 
the La Porta et al. (1998) index of creditor rights rather than legal origin, and find that stronger 
creditor rights are associated with lower interest rates and longer maturities. However, they also 
report that loans in countries of British legal origin carry higher rates and that higher rates are 
associated with greater financial development, which they attribute to higher loan demand for 
loans in more developed economies. 
The literature on “finance and economic growth” examines how economic growth is 
related to financial development. There now exists a wide empirical strand of the literature 
establishing a positive relationship between financial sector development and economic growth, 
although the direction of causality remains an issue of debate.  
Levine and Zervos (1998) document that stock-market liquidity and banking 
development are both positively and robustly correlated with future economic growth, capital 
accumulation and productivity growth.  
Rajan and Zingales (1998) examine the channels through which financial development 
promotes growth. They find that industrial sectors more dependent upon external finance 
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develop disproportionately faster in countries with more developed financial markets. Hence, 
banks promote economic growth by reducing the cost of external finance of firms.  
Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) find that financial development boosts economic growth 
primarily by improving resource allocation and accelerating total factor productivity growth.  
 This positive effect of financial development on growth is found to be robust to different 
econometric methods, from the cross-country regressions, cross-country instrumental variable 
studies and time-series analyses to the dynamic panel GMM estimations. Levine (2004) provides 
an excellent review on the research in this area. 
 Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998, 2002) and Levine (1999) tie these two strands of 
the literature together. Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) use firm level data investigate how 
differences in legal systems affect use of external financing. They find that a greater portion of 
firms in countries with more efficient legal systems use external financing to fund growth. 
 Levine (1999) uses country-level data to examine how legal environment affect financial 
development and subsequent long-run economic growth. He finds that financial intermediaries 
are better developed in countries with better legal protection and that the portion of financial 
intermediary development explained by the legal environment is positively related to economic 
growth. 
 Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) use firm-level data from 40 countries to analyze 
how a country’s legal and financial systems affect a firm’s ability to access external finance to 
fund growth opportunities. They find that the access to external finance is primarily a function of 
the efficiency of a country’s legal system. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
         Our sample includes 16,877 bank-year observations on 2,723 banks located in 102 
emerging-market countries. In terms of bank representation, Latin America dominates the 
sample and Northern Europe includes the least number of banks. Brazil, Panama and Argentina 
have the largest number of banks, followed by China, India, Lebanon and Poland, with Estonia, 
Qatar and Kuwait having the smallest number of banks. 
 We retrieve bank-level financial data for the years 2000-2006 from the BankScope 
database provided by Fitch-IBCA (International Bank Credit Analysis Ltd).  We collect 
information on total assets, total loans, and total equity from the banks annual balance sheets 
along with net income from the banks’ annual income statements. We use these financial data to 
create standard prudential ratios of performance, capitalization and risk-taking, including return 
on assets (ROA), equity to assets (Equity to Assets), and total loans to total assets (Loans to 
Assets).  
 We retrieve country-level “macro” data from the Heritage Foundation and from the 
International Financial Statistics. These include indices on banking activity restrictions, property 
rights, and GDP per capita.  
 Finally, we collect information on legal origin, creditors’ rights, and procedural formalism 
from Professor Andrei Shleifer’s Harvard web pages.2  Legal origin is coded as a set of five 
dummy variables, one each for English, French, Germanic, Scandinavian and Socialist legal 
systems. In our sample, we have no Germanic or Scandinavian countries.  
 Legal Formalism is an estimate of the number of days necessary to collect an unpaid debt 
equal to 50% of the country’s GDP per capita, which is used by Djankov et al. (2007).  
                                                          
2 http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/data.html 
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 We then merge these country-level data with our bank-level data. A description of the 
country-level governance and macroeconomic variables appears in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Appendix 1 presents the values of these governance variables by country and averaged by legal 
origin. 
 With these data, we first calculate univariate statistics and conduct some simple tests for 
differences in means of performance and condition, splitting our samples into groups with high 
and low levels of our governance indices. These tests provide some broad evidence on the 
importance of legal origin and creditor rights to the performance and risk-taking of banks. Next, 
we implement multivariate regression analyses to analyze these relationships more fully in a 
multivariate setting. Specifically, we analyze different versions of the following regression 
model: 
   Y i, t = β X j   +  δ C j   +  η Z j, t  +  ε i, t       (1) 
where:  
 Y i, t measures risk by the ratio of total loans to total assets, profitability by the ratio of net 
 income to total assets or net income to total equity, and capital adequacy by the ratio of 
 equity to total assets for bank i during year t; 
 X j is a set of dummy variables describing the legal origin of country j; 
 C j is a set of structural variables describing the country j, including governance indices that 
 measure investor protection; 
 Z j, t controls for the macroeconomic environment in terms of the level of economic 
 development; and 
 ε i, t is a random error term for bank i during year t. 
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  Because we analyze panel data, we cannot rely upon ordinary-least-squares regression 
techniques as our error terms would be serially correlated. Typically, one must choose between a 
fixed-effects model and a random-effects model when analyzing panel data such as ours; 
however, we are constrained to using a random-effects model because our primary variables of 
interest—our indicators for Legal Origin—are invariant at both the bank and country levels. 
Therefore, they cannot be estimated using a fixed-effects model because they would be collinear 
with the fixed-effects dummy variables.  Consequently, we estimate all models using bank-level 
random effects. 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
 Our primary hypotheses are: (1) that banks in countries with English legal origin enjoy 
superior institutions that enable them to make more loans; and (2) banks in countries with less 
legal formalism enjoy superior creditors’ rights that enable them to make more loans. The logic 
behind our hypotheses is that bankers are concerned about the total risk exposure of their loan 
portfolio. When they enjoy better legal protection reducing their risk of expropriation by 
borrowers, then they are able to take on increased portfolio risk by making more loans per dollar 
of assets. 
 We also test how profitability and bank capitalization are affected by differences in legal 
origin and legal protection. We have no prior expectations about either measure. Profitability 
should be higher if the banks increase portfolio risk beyond what they gain from reduced risk of 
expropriation attributable to superior legal protection, but should be lower if banks choose to 
reduce their overall level of risk. Capitalization as measured by the ratio of equity to asset should 
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be higher if better legal protection comes in the form of more stringent banking supervision; 
alternatively, it should be lower if better legal protection reduces the need to hold capital as a 
reserve against expected losses. In other words, an alternative to increasing portfolio risk is to 
increase the risk of financial distress by increasing leverage.  
 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on the credit risk exposure, capitalization level and 
profitability of banks by legal origin and other governance variables. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 Figures appearing in Panel A of Table 2 indicate significant variation in the ratio of total 
loans to total assets by legal origin—0.449 for French, 0.499 for English and 0.517 for Socialist. 
The 0.504 difference between English and French, the 0.0679 difference between Socialist and 
French, and the 0.0175 difference between Socialist and English legal origin each is statistically 
significant at better than the 0.01 level based upon a t-test for difference in means. Hence, the 
simple descriptive statistic show that banks in countries of French legal origin allocate the 
smallest portion of their portfolios to loans whereas banks in countries of Socialist legal origin 
allocate the largest portion of their portfolios to loans, with banks in countries of English legal 
origin lying in between. 
 There are even larger differences in capitalization—0.1033 for English, 0.1551 for French 
and 0.1807 for Socialist. Again, the differences in each pair of these means (0.0774 between 
Socialist and French, 0.0518 between French and English, and 0.0246 between French and 
English) are statistically significant at better than the 0.01 level based upon a t-test for 
differences in means. 
 Differences in profitability are less pronounced—141 basis points for Socialist, 136 basis 
points for English and 111 basis points for French. Each of these differences (5 basis points 
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between Socialist and English, 25 basis points between English and French, and 30 basis points 
between Socialist and French) is statistically significant at better than the 0.05 level, although the 
economic significance of the 5 basis point difference is debatable.  
 Panel B of Table 2 examines differences by legal formalism. We split the sample at the 
median value of the days to recover a debt equal to half of the country’s GDP per capita. High 
Legal Formalism includes banks with greater than the median days of recovery, indicating less 
efficient legal enforcement. Here, we see that banks in countries with less efficient legal systems 
allocate significantly less of their asset portfolio to loans (46.39 percent of assets for High Legal 
Formalism versus 50.96 percent of assets for Low Legal Formalism), hold significantly less 
capital (14.15 percent of assets versus 15.97 percent of assets), and are significantly less 
profitable (108 basis points versus 149 basis points). 
 Panel C of Table 2 examines differences by banking freedom as measured by the Heritage 
Foundation. Lower values of this index are associated with greater banking freedom. Again, we 
split our sample at the median value, here 3.0, with banks receiving lower values going into the 
Strong Banking Freedom group while the remaining banks go into the Weak Banking Freedom 
group.  We find that the Strong Banking Freedom group holds significantly smaller loan 
portfolios, significantly more capital and is significantly less profitable. 
 Finally, Panel D of Table 2 examines differences by Property Rights as measured by the 
Heritage Foundation, where lower values are associated with stronger property rights. We 
classify banks in countries with less than the median value of 3.0 as Strong while the remaining 
banks we classify as Weak. Here, we find that banks in countries with Strong Rights allocate 
significantly less of their assets to loans (47.3 percent versus 50.17 percent), hold significantly 
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more capital (15.31 percent of assets versus 14.80 percent of assets) and are significantly less 
profitable (121 basis points versus 137 basis points ROA). 
 Overall, the univariate statistics in Table 2 paint a murky picture of how portfolio risk, 
capitalization and profitability differ across governance regimes. In the next section, we attempt 
to isolate the effects of governance using multivariate analyses. 
 
Multivariate Regression Analysis: Loans to Assets 
 The results of the multivariate analyses of equation (1) appear in Tables 3-5. In each of 
these tables, we present five specifications estimated using a random-effects model. We begin in 
specification (1) with dummies for legal origin (French and Socialist, with English being the 
omitted category); in specification (2), we add a control for differences in economic development 
(log of GDP per capita); in (3), we add our measure of Legal Formalism; in (4) we add indicators 
for Banking Freedom and Property Rights; and, finally, in (5), we add two bank-level control 
variables—bank size as measured by the log of total assets and an indicator variable for foreign 
ownership. 
 In Table 3 are the results where the dependent variable is our measure of credit risk 
exposure—the ratio of total loans to total assets.  
[Table 3 about here] 
 The effect of legal origin is measured relative to the omitted category, which is English 
legal origin. Hence, the coefficients on French and Socialist measure the difference in the loan-
to-asset ratio of these groups from that of the excluded French group of banks. The explanatory 
variable French, is negative but lacks statistical significance, whereas the explanatory variable 
Socialist is positive and highly significant. The coefficient of Socialist ranges from 0.0653 to 
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0.1124, indicating that banks in countries of Socialist legal origin allocate an additional 6.53 to 
11.24 percent of their assets to their loan portfolios relative to the omitted English legal origin 
category. Given the average loan-to-asset ratio of slightly less than 0.50, this represents a 13- to 
22-percent increase in the amount of credit that banks are injecting into the economy. These 
results strongly contradict one of our primary hypothesis: that better legal protection offered in 
countries of English legal origin enables banks in those countries to take on more portfolio risk 
without increasing their total risk (portfolio risk plus country-level legal risk).  
 In specification (2) of Table 3, we add our control of economic development—the natural 
log of per capita Gross Domestic Product. Surprisingly, this variable is insignificant in all 
specifications and flips signs. 
 In specification (3), we add the Djankov et al. (2007) measure of legal formalism—the 
natural logarithm of the number of days needed to recover a debt equal to half of country’s GDP 
per capita—to the explanatory variables in specification (2). Higher values indicate less efficient 
judicial enforcement of the country’s laws. The coefficient of Legal Formalism is negative and 
highly significant, indicating that banks in countries with greater legal formalism (less efficient 
enforcement) allocate significantly less of their asset portfolios to loans. The coefficient indicates 
that a one standard deviation increase in legal formalism would be associated with a loan to asset 
ratio that is lower by almost two percentage points.  
 In specification (4), we add the two Heritage Foundation indices—Banking Freedom and 
Property Rights—to the variables appearing in specification (3). Only the coefficient on Banking 
Freedom is statistically significant. The negative coefficient on Banking Freedom indicates that 
banks located in countries with greater banking freedom allocate significantly more of their 
assets to loans than do banks in countries with less banking freedom, and that moving from the 
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worst to best value of this indexes (2.5 to -2.5) would increase the loan to asset ratio by 
approximately 0.0183 x 5 = 0.0916 or 9.16 percentage points.  
 Finally, in specification (5), we add two bank-level control variables—bank size as 
measured by the natural log of total assets and an indicator for foreign control of the bank. Bank 
size is positive and highly significant, indicating that larger banks allocate significantly more of 
their assets to loans. The dummy variable for foreign control is negative and significant, 
indicating that foreign-controlled banks allocate fewer of their assets to loans. 
 At the bottom of Table 3 are the covariance parameters, which are the estimates for the 
random-effects portion of the model. The intercept coefficient measures the random effects 
attributable to the differences across banks but not within banks. The residual coefficient 
measures the random effects attributable to differences across time within a bank. Both 
covariance parameters are highly significant, but the coefficient for intercept is much larger than 
that of residual, indicating that most of the total variation in the model occurs among banks 
rather than across time within a bank. 
 
Multivariate Regression Analysis: Equity to Assets 
 Thus far, we have focused on the ratio of total loans to total assets, as much of the research 
on finance and growth has focused on how private sector credit leads to economic growth. 
However, better creditor protection could provide an incentive for banks to increase their 
financial risk rather than or in addition to their portfolio risk. Therefore, we also are interested in 
whether and, if so, how creditor protection affects bank capitalization.  In Table 4 are the results 
where our dependent variable is bank capitalization as measured by the ratio of Equity to Assets. 
[Table 4 about here] 
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 As in Table 3, we sequentially enter our variables and English legal origin is the omitted 
category, so coefficients on French and Socialist measure the difference in the equity to asset 
ratios for banks in these countries relative to banks in English countries.  In specification (1), we 
enter our dummies for French and Socialist legal origin. The coefficient on French is 0.024, 
indicating that capital ratios for banks of French legal origin are 2.4 percentage points higher 
than for banks of English legal origin. The coefficient on Socialist is even higher at 0.0638, 
indicating that banks of Socialist legal origin are 6.38 percentage points higher than those of 
English legal origin. It is important to point out that the average capital ratio is about 15 percent 
of assets so these differences are extremely large in percentage terms—around 15 percent for the 
difference between English and French and around forty percent for Socialist. 
 In specification (2), we add our control for financial development. The coefficient on this 
variable is positive and significant, indicating that banks in countries with higher GDP per capita 
hold significantly more capital.  This difference may be attributable to more stringent banking 
supervision at countries with higher levels of financial development. 
 In specification (3), we add our measure of Legal Formalism to the variables included in 
specification (1) and find that its coefficient is positive but only marginally significant. This 
result indicates that creditors’ rights have a limited effect on bank capitalization. 
 In specification (4), we add our two Heritage indices—Banking Freedom and Property 
Rights. Banking Freedom is positive and highly significant, indicating that banks in countries 
with less banking freedom must hold significantly more capital than banks in countries with 
more banking freedom. The coefficient on Property Rights is statistically insignificant.   
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 Finally, in specification (5), we add our two bank-level control variables. Bank size is 
negative and highly significant, indicating that larger banks hold significantly less capital than 
their smaller counterparts. Foreign control is positive, but statistically insignificant. 
 The random-effects covariance parameters once again indicate that most of the explained 
variation in the capital ratio is attributable to differences across banks rather than differences 
across time. 
 Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that banks in countries of English legal origin are 
more highly levered than banks in countries of other legal origins, which is consistent with the 
substitution of solvency risk for expropriation risk, similar to what we observed in Table 3, 
where portfolio risk was substituted for expropriation risk.  
  
Multivariate Regression Analysis: Return on Assets 
 In Table 5 are the results where our dependent variable is bank profitability as measured by 
Return on Assets.   
[Table 5 about here] 
 In specification (1), the coefficient of French is negative and highly significant, indicating 
that banks of French legal origin have an average ROA that is lower than banks of English legal 
origin by 56 basis points. The average ROA is 130 basis points so this is a huge difference in 
profitability. The coefficient on Socialist legal origin is only 3 basis points, which is not 
statistically (or economically) different from zero. Hence, it appears that banks of French legal 
origin are significantly less profitable than other banks.  
 In specification (2), we add our measure of financial development. The coefficient on log 
of GDP per capita is negative but statistically insignificant. Similarly, when we add Legal 
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Formalism (specification (3)), it also is negative but statistically insignificant.  In specification 
(4), we add our two Heritage indicators—Banking Freedom and Property Rights. Both are 
positive and significant at better than the 0.05 level, indicating that less banking freedom and 
fewer property rights are associated with lower bank profitability. We interpret these results as 
showing that less banking freedom and fewer property rights result in banks earning lower 
returns.  
 Finally, we add our two bank-level controls in specification (5). We find that larger banks 
are significantly more profitable, but that banks under foreign control are no less profitable than 
banks under domestic control. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 In this article, we extend the law and finance literature by using firm-level data from almost 
three-thousand banks in 102 emerging-market countries to analyze how lenders respond to 
differences in legal origin and investor protection. Using a random-effects model that controls 
for bank heterogeneity, we find that lenders allocate a significantly higher portion of their assets 
to loans (i) where they enjoy Socialist legal origin rather than French or English legal origin; (ii) 
where enforcement of debt contracts is more efficient and (iii) where banks enjoy fewer 
restrictions on their operations. These results indicate that, when banks operate in countries with 
strong business and legal environments, they substitute portfolio risk and solvency risk for 
expropriation risk. These findings support our hypothesis that superior legal protection leads to 
more bank credit, which, in turn, should lead to higher economic growth, but contradict our 
hypothesis that banks in countries of English legal origin enjoy superior legal protection that 
leads them to provide more bank credit.  We find mixed results for bank capitalization and 
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profitability. Creditor protection does not appear to influence bank capitalization or profitability. 
Legal origin does appear to influence both bank capitalization and profitability. Banks in 
countries of Socialist legal origin hold significantly more capital, but make significantly more 
loans. Banks in countries of French legal origin hold more capital and are less profitable. 
 These results provide new evidence on the importance of legal origin and investor 
protection to financial sector development and economic growth. Researchers in the “finance and 
growth” literature have established that better financial sector development as measured by 
aggregate domestic private credit lead to higher levels of economic growth. We extend the 
literature by documenting one channel by which legal protection leads to financial sector 
development. With better investor protection, bankers increase the portion of their assets 
allocated to loans. In aggregate, this should lead to higher levels of private sector credit, which 
the “finance and growth” literature has shown to be positively related to economic growth. 
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Table 1:  
Definitions of Country-Level Governance and Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Variable Name Description 
Banking and Finance 
Freedom 
An indicator of relative openness of banking & financial system. The index ranges in 
value from 1 (very high) to 5 (very low). It reflects 
• Government ownership of financial institutions 
• Restrictions on the ability of foreign banks to open branches and subsidiaries 
• Government influence over the allocation of credit 
• Government regulations 
Source: Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom  
Property Rights Freedom from government influence over the judicial system 
• Commercial code defining contracts 
• Sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract disputes 
• Government expropriation of property 
• Corruption within the judiciary 
• Delays in receiving judicial decisions 
• Legally granted and protected private property 
A lower score indicates better protection of property rights in the country. 
Source: Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom 
Legal Origin  Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country 
(English, French, Socialist, German, Scandinavian). Source: Djankov et al. (2003). 
Legal Formalism 1 An estimate of the number of days that necessary to collect on a bounced check 
before the courts in the country’ largest city. These estimates were prepared by law 
firms in each country surveyed by Djankov et al. (2003).  
Source: Djankov et al. (2003) 
2 An alternative measure is an estimate of the number of days necessary to collect an 
unpaid debt equal to 50% of the country’s GDP per capita, which is used by Djankov 
et al. (2007). Source: Djankov et al. (2007)  
Higher values indicate greater procedural formalism and greater inefficiency in 
judicial enforcement. 
Per Capita GDP  Logarithm of per capita GDP. Source: International Financial Statistics 
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Observations Loans to Equity to ROA
 Asset Assets
All 16,975       0.4870 0.1507 0.0129
0.0015 0.0010 0.0002
English 4,500         0.4994 0.1033 0.0136
0.0026 0.0013 0.0003
French 6,324         0.4490 0.1551 0.0111
0.0027 0.0017 0.0004
Socialist 6,151         0.5169 0.1807 0.0141
0.0023 0.0018 0.0003
Hi Legal Formalism 8,570         0.4639 0.1415 0.0108
0.0021 0.0015 0.0003
Low Legal Formalism 8,405         0.5096 0.1597 0.0149
0.0021 0.0014 0.0002
Strong Banking Freedom 8,805         0.4733 0.1531 0.0121
0.0022 0.0014 0.0030
Weak Banking Freedom 8,170         0.5017 0.1480 0.0137
0.0020 0.0015 0.0002
Strong Property Rights 8,805         0.4733 0.1531 0.0121
0.0022 0.0014 0.0003
Weak Property Rights 8,170         0.5017 0.1480 0.0137
0.0020 0.0015 0.0002
Based upon an unbalanced panel of 2,723 banks in 102 emerging markets over the years 2000-2006. Loans to Assets 
is the ratio of total loans to total assets; Equity to Assets is the ratio of total equity to total assets; ROA is the ratio of 
net income to total assets. Each of these three variables is measured at the bank level in each year. Means appear 
above standard errors. English, French and Socialist are dummy variables indicating English, French or Socialist legal 
origin as first defined by La Porta et al. 1998. Legal Formalism is the number of days needed to recover a debt equal 
to half of the country’s GDP per capita. Creditor Rights is the index of creditors rights first described in La Porta et al 
1998. Banking Freedom is an index of banking freedom defined by the Heritage Foundation. Property Rights is an 
index of Property Rights defined by the Heritage Foundation. Table 1 provides more details on each variable. High 
versus Low and Strong versus Weak refer to a split of the variable at the median value.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
By Legal Origin, Legal Formalism, Banking Freedom and Property Rights
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.4587 a 0.4568 a 0.7140 a 0.7070 a 0.3928 a
0.0075 0.0082  0.0552  0.0656  0.0726
French Legal Origin -0.0125 -0.0115  -0.0050  -0.0130  -0.0086  
0.0093 0.0094 0.0095 0.0097 0.0096
Socialist Legal Origin 0.0701 a 0.0696 a 0.0653 a 0.0746 0.1124 a
0.0086 0.0091 0.0093 0.0105 0.0108
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.0014  0.0022  -0.0010  -0.0055  
0.0027 0.0027 0.0031 0.0032
Legal Formalism -0.0436 a -0.0356 a -0.0326 a
0.0091 0.0106 0.0104
Banking Freedom -0.0183 a -0.0143 a
0.0036 0.0035
Property Rights 0.0079 0.0020
0.0047 0.0046
Bank Size (Ln(Bank Assets))      0.0246 a
   0.0024
Foreign Control of Bank     -0.0136 b
0.0067
COVARIANCE
Intercept 0.0326 a 0.0324 a 0.0321 a 0.0328 a 0.0340 a
0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010
Residual 0.0074 a 0.0074 a 0.0074 a 0.0074 a 0.0069 a
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Observations 16,887  16,887  16,887  16,887  16,887  
Based upon an unbalanced panel of 2,723 banks in 102 emerging markets over the years 2000-2006 for a 
total of 16,887 observations. ln(GDP per capita) is the natural logarithm of the country’s per capita Gross 
Domestic Product in each year. English, French and Socialist are dummy variables indicating English, 
French or Socialist legal origin as first defined by La Porta et al. 1998. English is the omitted category. 
Legal Formalism is the natural logarithm of the number of days needed to recover a debt equal to half of 
the country’s GDP per capita, as defined by Djankov et al. (2007). Banking Freedom is an index of 
banking freedom defined by the Heritage Foundation. Property Rights is an index of Property Rights 
defined by the Heritage Foundation. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Foreign Control of 
Bank is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the largest shareholder is from another 
country and zero otherwise. Table 1 provides more details on each variable. Coefficients appear above 
robust standard errors. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectiv
Random-Effects Regressions to Explain the Ratio of Total Loans to Total Assets
Table 3
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.1376 a 0.1316 a 0.07478 b 0.08737 b 0.6662 a
0.00482 0.00501  0.0345  0.03814  0.0444
French Legal Origin 0.02404 a 0.02031 a 0.01888 a 0.02184 a 0.01316 b
0.00629 0.00642 0.0064 0.00645 0.0057
Socialist Legal Origin 0.06383 a 0.05889 a 0.05984 a 0.04938 a -0.0202 a
0.00604 0.00662 0.00667 0.00739 0.00727
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.00422 b 0.00404 b 0.00761 a 0.01628 a
0.00171 0.00171 0.00201 0.00183
Legal Formalism 0.00964 c 0.00227  -0.0033  
0.00567 0.00586 0.00524
Banking Freedom 0.00755 a 0.00038  
0.00252 0.00228
Property Rights 0.0000 0.0100 a
0.0030 0.0027
Bank Size (Ln(Bank Assets))   -0.0449 a
0.00223
Foreign Control of Bank  0.00093  
0.00323
COVARIANCE
Intercept 0.0181 a 0.0182 a 0.0181 a 0.0179 a 0.0140 a
0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004
Residual 0.0034 a 0.0034 a 0.0034 a 0.0033 a 0.0027 a
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 16,887  16,887  16,887  16,887  16,887  
Table 4
Random-Effects Regressions to Explain the Ratio of Total Equity to Total Assets
Based upon an unbalanced panel of 2,723 banks in 102 emerging markets over the years 2000-2006 for a 
total of 16,887 observations. ln(GDP per capita) is the natural logarithm of the country’s per capita Gross 
Domestic Product in each year. English, French and Socialist are dummy variables indicating English, 
French or Socialist legal origin as first defined by La Porta et al. 1998. English is the omitted category. 
Legal Formalism is the natural logarithm of the number of days needed to recover a debt equal to half of 
the country’s GDP per capita, as defined by Djankov et al. (2007). Banking Freedom is an index of 
banking freedom defined by the Heritage Foundation. Property Rights is an index of Property Rights 
defined by the Heritage Foundation. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Foreign Control of 
Bank is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the largest shareholder is from another 
country and zero otherwise. Table 1 provides more details on each variable. Coefficients appear above 
robust standard errors. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectiv
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.01478 a 0.01539 a 0.01956 a 0.00242 a 0.00201 a
0.00087 0.0010  0.0062  0.0067  0.0075
French Legal Origin -0.0056 a -0.0054 a -0.0053 a -0.0058 a -0.0056 a
0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011
Socialist Legal Origin 0.0003  0.0008  0.0007 a -0.0029 b -0.0006  
0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0012 0.0013
Ln(GDP per capita) -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0009 b 0.00069 c
0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004
Legal Formalism -0.0007  -0.0012  -0.0011  
0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
Banking Freedom 0.00145 b 0.0016 a
0.0006 0.0006
Property Rights 0.0039 a 0.0040 a
0.0007 0.0007
Bank Size (Ln(Bank Assets))   0.0017 a
0.0003
Foreign Control of Bank  -0.0002  
0.0010
COVARIANCE
Intercept 0.0004 a 0.0004 a 0.0004 a 0.0004 a 0.0004 a
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Residual 0.0003 a 0.0003 a 0.0003 a 0.0003 a 0.0003 a
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 16,887  16,887  16,887  16,887  16,887  
Table 5
Random-Effects Regressions to Explain the Ratio of Net Income to Total Assets
Based upon an unbalanced panel of 2,723 banks in 102 emerging markets over the years 2000-2006 for a 
total of 16,887 observations. ln(GDP per capita) is the natural logarithm of the country’s per capita Gross 
Domestic Product in each year. English, French and Socialist are dummy variables indicating English, 
French or Socialist legal origin as first defined by La Porta et al. 1998. English is the omitted category. 
Legal Formalism is the natural logarithm of the number of days needed to recover a debt equal to half of 
the country’s GDP per capita, as defined by Djankov et al. (2007). Banking Freedom is an index of 
banking freedom defined by the Heritage Foundation. Property Rights is an index of Property Rights 
defined by the Heritage Foundation. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Foreign Control of 
Bank is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the largest shareholder is from another 
country and zero otherwise. Table 1 provides more details on each variable. Coefficients appear above 
robust standard errors. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectiv
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Legal GDP Loans Equity ROA
Country Name Obs. Formalism per capita to Assets to Assets  
English
BANGLADESH 354 365 400 0.631 0.062 0.0099
BOTSWANA 45 154 3,430 0.468 0.115 0.0302
ETHIOPIA 50 420 90 0.552 0.098 0.0153
GHANA 191 200 320 0.411 0.128 0.0246
INDIA 987 425 530 0.486 0.064 0.0084
IRAN 39 545 2,000 0.540 0.226 0.0335
JAMAICA 35 202 2,760 0.250 0.147 0.0247
KENYA 238 360 390 0.535 0.175 0.0128
LESOTHO 20 285 590 0.150 0.096 0.0162
MALAWI 32 277 170 0.297 0.143 0.0400
MALAYSIA 409 300 3,780 0.547 0.104 0.0109
NAMIBIA 20 270 1,870 0.749 0.321 0.0222
NEPAL 159 350 240 0.591 0.118 0.0091
NIGERIA 371 730 320 0.320 0.128 0.0225
PAKISTAN 339 395 470 0.451 0.072 0.0090
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 37 295 510 0.332 0.099 0.0412
SAINT LUCIA 3 360 0.652 0.098 0.0111
SIERRA LEONE 27 305 150 0.199 0.186 0.0627
SOUTH AFRICA 61 277 2,780 0.555 0.184 0.0134
SRI LANKA 230 440 930 0.653 0.087 0.0077
TANZANIA 56 242 290 0.376 0.130 0.0136
THAILAND 537 390 2,190 0.627 0.105 0.0090
UGANDA 84 209 240 0.419 0.138 0.0278
YEMEN 66 360 520 0.211 0.195 -0.0067
ZAMBIA 66 274 380 0.262 0.153 0.0454
ZIMBABWE 44 350 480 0.354 0.115 0.0474
Average 338  1,033  0.447  0.134  0.0216
Based upon an unbalanced panel of 2,723 banks in 103 emerging markets over the years 2000-2006. Loans to Assets is 
the ratio of total loans to total assets; Equity to Assets is the ratio of total equity to total assets; ROA is the ratio of net 
income to total assets. Each of these three variables is measured at the bank level in each year. Means appear above 
standard errors. English, French and Socialist are dummy variables indicating English, French or Socialist legal origin 
as first defined by La Porta et al. 1998. Legal Formalism is the number of days needed to recover a debt equal to half of 
the country’s GDP per capita. Banking Freedom is an index of banking freedom defined by the Heritage Foundation. 
Property Rights is an index of Property Rights defined by the Heritage Foundation. Table 1 provides more details on 
each variable.
Country-Level Goverance, Macro-economic and Banking Data
Appendix Table 1
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Appendix 1: (continued) 
 
Legal GDP Loans Equity ROA
Country Name Obs. Formalism per capita to Assets to Assets  
French
ALBANIA 73 390 1,740 0.442 0.172 0.0035
ALGERIA 55 407 1,890 0.410 0.132 0.0092
ANGOLA 55 1,011 0.211 0.130 0.0215
ARGENTINA 475 520 3,650 0.379 0.235 -0.0060
BENIN 32 570 440 0.518 0.092 -0.0019
BOLIVIA 72 591 890 0.544 0.173 -0.0043
BRAZIL 705 566 2,710 0.372 0.200 0.0202
BURKINA FASO 44 458 300 0.603 0.091 0.0090
BURUNDI 36 512 100 0.632 0.142 0.0305
CAMBODIA 42 401 310 0.333 0.266 0.0042
CAMEROON 61 585 640 0.513 0.090 0.0126
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 7 660 260 0.789 0.114 0.0126
CHAD 14 526 250 0.631 0.127 0.0205
CHILE 216 305 4,390 0.610 0.159 0.0094
COLOMBIA 241 363 1,810 0.567 0.129 0.0186
CONGO 31 909 100 0.255 0.108 0.0109
CONGO REP. OF 2 560 640 0.252 0.060 0.0236
COSTA RICA 118 550 4,280 0.607 0.153 0.0170
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 178 580 2,070 0.526 0.216 0.0109
ECUADOR 194 388 1,790 0.415 0.127 -0.0106
EGYPT 216 410 1,390 0.456 0.089 0.0089
EL SALVADOR 81 275 2,200 0.558 0.169 0.0074
GUATEMALA 185 1,459 1,910 0.492 0.104 0.0041
GUINEA 8 306 430 0.451 0.108 0.0401
HONDURAS 139 545 970 0.566 0.114 0.0099
INDONESIA 489 570 810 0.446 0.115 0.0158
IVORY COAST 47 525 660 0.640 0.096 0.0033
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Appendix 1: (continued) 
 
JORDAN 26 342 1,850 0.413 0.094 0.0102
KUWAIT 32 390 330 0.486 0.119 0.0211
LAOS 5 443 320 0.278 0.010 0.0005
LEBANON 218 721 4,040 0.210 0.116 -0.0009
MADAGASCAR 34 280 290 0.458 0.110 0.0282
MALI 35 340 290 0.592 0.119 0.0060
MAURITANIA 34 410 430 0.511 0.214 0.0189
MEXICO 165 421 6,230 0.520 0.172 0.0054
MOROCCO 99 240 1,320 0.487 0.097 0.0122
MOZAMBIQUE 53 580 210 0.411 0.144 0.0118
NICARAGUA 40 155 730 0.439 0.085 0.0111
NIGER 25 330 200 0.532 0.104 0.0104
OMAN 55 455 7,830 0.722 0.111 0.0134
PANAMA 305 355 4,250 0.527 0.135 0.0145
PARAGUAY 111 285 1,100 0.444 0.146 0.0125
PERU 84 441 2,150 0.552 0.136 0.0072
PHILIPPINES 294 380 1,080 0.391 0.168 0.0134
RWANDA 51 395 220 0.381 0.269 0.0098
SENEGAL 86 485 550 0.537 0.100 0.0123
SYRIA 36 672 1,160 0.156 0.201 0.0077
TOGO 19 535 310 0.510 0.074 0.0092
TUNISIA 110 27 2,240 0.688 0.113 0.0060
TURKEY 340 330 2,790 0.313 0.162 0.0138
VENEZUELA 251 445 3,490 0.361 0.226 0.0335
Average 478  1,601  0.473  0.136  0.012
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Legal GDP Loans Equity ROA
Country Name Obs. Formalism per capita to Assets to Assets  
Socialist
ARMENIA 44 195 950 0.378 0.238 0.0167
AZERBAIJAN 84 267 810 0.519 0.257 0.0168
BELARUS 97 250 1,590 0.447 0.236 0.0151
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 150 330 1,540 0.515 0.227 0.0080
BULGARIA 144 440 2,130 0.489 0.171 0.0115
CHINA-PEOPLE'S REP. 509 241 1,100 0.542 0.064 0.0049
CROATIA 252 415 5,350 0.545 0.155 0.0120
CZECH REPUBLIC 113 300 6,740 0.354 0.099 0.0071
GEORGIA REP. OF 41 375 830 0.541 0.206 0.0203
HUNGARY 105 365 6,330 0.536 0.124 0.0129
KAZAKHSTAN 70 400 1,780 0.520 0.242 0.0206
KYRGYZSTAN 30 492 0.318 0.256 0.0206
LATVIA 144 189 4,070 0.416 0.125 0.0118
LITHUANIA 62 154 4,490 0.514 0.113 0.0045
MACEDONIA (FYROM) 68 509 1,980 0.470 0.316 0.0134
MOLDOVA REP. OF 92 280 590 0.546 0.248 0.0313
MONGOLIA 38 314 480 0.536 0.181 0.0102
POLAND 493 1,000 5,270 0.471 0.130 0.0123
ROMANIA 170 335 2,310 0.444 0.179 0.0054
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 2678 330 2,610 0.548 0.207 0.0171
SERBIA 245 1,028 1,910 0.429 0.273 0.0116
SLOVAKIA 55 565 4,920 0.402 0.095 0.0055
UKRAINE 210 269 970 0.587 0.168 0.0116
UZBEKISTAN 121 368 420 0.429 0.164 0.0298
VIETNAM 136 404 480 0.573 0.132 0.0092
Average    392.599977  2,485            0.483  0.184  0.014
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